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Abstract
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems for a given set of users
connected to a source. We propose a rule of sharing such that each user may
pay her cost for such a tree plus an additional amount to the others users. A
reduction of her cost appears as a compensation from the other users. Our first
result states the existence of a sharing such that no agent is willing to choose a
diﬀerent tree from the minimum cost tree (mcst) oﬀered by Prim’s algorithm.
Therefore, the mcst emerges as both a social and individual optimal solution.
Given a sharing system, we implement the above solution as a subgame perfect
equilibrium of a sequential game where players decide sequentially with whom
to connect. Moreover, the proposed solution is at the core of the monotone
cooperative game associated with a minimal cost spanning tree problem.
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1 Introduction
Cost-Sharing Network is a challenging issue. (See Harks and Miller, 2011; Babonneau,
Nesterov and Vial, 2012). Given a common project developed for several agents,
they should pay the total cost to implement the most-liked network. Therefore, two
questions arise about how to allocate the cost and how agents agree to implement such
network. A large literature aims the first problem. A common approach consists of the
design of rules that satisfy axioms representing properties as incentive, fairness, among
others. See for instance, Bergantin˜os and Kar (2010), Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo-Freire
(2008a, 2008b), Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a, 2007b, 2009), Bogomolnaia and
Moulin (2010a, 2010b), among others). The second problem stems on strategic issue.
In many network settings, users are motivated by self-interest; hence, it solution
should be in tune with incentive-compatible behavior. See Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo-
Freire (2004), Bergantinn˜s and Vidal-Puga (2007a), Chen, Rougharden and Valiant
(2010), etc.
We focus on complete weighted networks with n users and an additional special
node named the source. By Prim’s algorithm (Prim, 1957), it is known how to
connect the users in such a way the total cost of the project “all connected to the
source” was minimal. The algorithm provides an optimal social solution in the sense
that if an external planner had to choose a tree, she would choose this one involving
the lowest cost for the society. Nevertheless, if every user could choose a tree and
with whom she would be connected, the minimal tree oﬀered by Prim may not be
a practical solution. Users may find profitable to secede from the “social” optimal
solution taking her individual best choice. We ask what should be a sharing of the
total cost satisfying incentive compatible condition, in other words, what are the
conditions such that any user prefers to implement the Prim’s minimal cost spanning
tree rather than any other tree.
We propose a sharing cost rule based on side payments or compensations. A
collection of transfers xij for each user k is put forward. It means the amount that
user i pays to j if she connects with k. Consequently, for all tree where j and k are
linked, the user i shares the cost of this link by xij . Fix a tree where each user is
connected directly or indirectly to the source. Taking into account such transfers,
the final cost of implementing such a tree for each user is characterized as the sum of
three terms. First of all, each user pays the cost of the link she uses, her direct cost.
A second term corresponds to the user pays to whom is connected, her immediate
predecessor. This second term is understood as the amount paid for being linked
to the other users in order to implement the tree. The last term is the quantity
she receives from other users to properly connect with her. Therefore, additional
amounts are transferred across agents in order to sustain the specific tree. Our first
result states the existence of a family of compensations, cost sharing structures, such
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that no agent has incentives to choose another tree than the minimum cost tree
oﬀered by Prim. Therefore, the minimal spanning tree emerges as both a social and
an individual solution.
The family of cost sharing structures has two desirable features taking into account
the non-cooperative and the cooperative perspectives. Following a non- cooperative
approach, a finite sequential game is defined. The users of the network are the agents
in this extensive game. At each stage, the set of actions for agent i is the set of
users and source with whom she connects. In this game, payoﬀ vectors depend on the
cost sharing structure. Each terminal node is associated to a path which represents
a feasible tree. This describes a finite extensive game with perfect information. The
existence of a pure subgame perfect equilibrium is guaranteed for the finitely condi-
tions. Our second result states that the path associated to the minimal cost spanning
tree is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Following the approach in Granot and Maschler (1998), or Kar (2002), it is possible
to associate to every cost spanning tree problem a cooperative monotone game. A
coalition is formed if its members agree to connect each one of them to the source.
We allow the members of a coalition to connect themselves using cheaper edges,
even they may choose to be connected through players that do not belong to the
coalition. However, we require that the formed coalition should be a connected sub-
graph. Given this cooperative approach, the transferable utility game is generated by
considering the minimum cost spanning tree for each coalition. Now, by considering
the usual solutions of cooperative games, a solution of the problem of distributing
the minimal cost of a spanning tree problem is obtained. Given an optimal cost
structure, our last result states that the cost distribution we provide is in the core of
the cooperative game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of
our network structure together with the extensive game and the cooperative game
associated to the network. Several examples drive to the goal of the paper. Sections
3 states the main results by building up an optimal cost structure. Section 4 closes
the paper with the strategic and cooperative properties of our solution.
2 Model
2.1 Networks
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents and 0 the source they want to be con-
nected. Denote by N0 = N ∪ {0}. A graph over N0 is a function p : N #→ N0 so
that i connects p(i). We only consider graphs where any agent is (directly or indi-
rectly) connected to the source; that is, p such that for all i there is some t ∈ N:
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p ◦ . . . ◦ p = pt(i) = 0 and we name feasible tree to a connected graph where there is
a unique path from i to the source for all i ∈ N .
Let C be the cost matrix, where cij ∈ R+ represents the connection cost between
agents i, j ∈ N0. The social network is represented by (N0,C). Assume, as usual,
that cii = 0 and C is symmetric, i.e., cij = cji.
Prim (1957) oﬀers an algorithm for solving the problem of connecting all agents to
the source such that the total cost of creating the network is minimum. The achieved
solution may not be unique. Denote bym the tree with minimal cost obtained through
Prim’s algorithm and by Cm its cost. That is,
Cm =
n∑
i=i
cim(i) ≤
n∑
i=i
cip(i)
for all feasible p. Our target is to set proposals on how the total (minimal) cost Cm is
distributed amongst agents verifying individual incentive condition, i.e., each agent
prefers to implement the minimal spanning tree.
2.2 Cost structure
Before introducing our notion of cost structure, we analyse the following example.
Example 1 Consider individuals a, b, and c, who want the service of cable network
in their respective houses. There is only one cable operator, whom we will call the
source, in the locality. It is not necessary for each one to be connected directly to the
source. For instance, a could be connected to b and b to the source, thereby providing
an indirect connection of a to the source. The costs of connections are represented by
a cost matrix C,
C =
⎡
⎣ 4 0 1 210 1 0 3
20 2 3 0
⎤
⎦
where the first column represents the cost of direct connections to the source. The
following figure shows the graphical representation of this problem:
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The first objective is to find the minimum cost cable network in which a, b, and c
are connected to the source. The minimum cost will be 7 units and the minimum cost
spanning tree is:
0
a b c1
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The remaining question is how the total cost of 7 units is distributed amongst a,
b, and c. In order to discuss this problem, if we fix our attention on agent a, her cost
to directly connect with the source is 4 units, whereas she can connect to b with a cost
of 1 unit. So, she would be willing to pay up to 3 units to agent b, in order that b
connects to the source and then a can connect through b. By using this idea we define
a set of side payments:
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We represent xij(k) as the amount that player i pays to player j if she connects
with k. In other words, player i pays xij(k) to player j for all tree p such that p(j) = k.
For each node k ∈ N we designate the following matrix:
X(k) = [xij(k)]n×n =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
x11(k) x12(k) · · · x1n(k)
x21(k) x22(k) · · · x2n(k)
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
xn1(k) xn2(k) · · · xnn(k)
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
The cost structure is the family of matrices x = {X(k)}k∈N0. Notice that, unlike
what happens with the cost matrixC, matrices X(k) need not be a symmetric matrix.
We are now ready to write down the cost of implementation C(i; p) for an agent i ∈ N ,
a given feasible tree p, and a cost structure x:
C(i; p)x = cip(i) + xip(i)(p
2(i))−
∑
{k:p(k)=i}
xki(p(i))
where cip(i) corresponds to the direct cost for agent i to be connected to player p(i).
The second term is the amount that player i pays to p(i) her immediate predecessor
(the agent with whom i connects) to sustain the tree p, given the cost structure.
Therefore, for being linked to the other agents to follow the tree p. The last term is
the amount received by agent i from the other agents to properly connect with her.
Given a tree p and a cost structure x = {X(k)}k∈N0, it is immediate to observe that
the sum of the individual costs C(i; p)x is equal to the cost of the tree denoted by Cp.
n∑
i=i
C(i; p)x = Cp =
n∑
i=i
cip(i)
So, the cost structure provides a way of distributing the cost of the tree.
Example 2 A possible cost structure for the problem in Example 1 is given by:
X(0) =
⎡
⎣ 0 3 29 0 7
18 17 0
⎤
⎦ ;X(a) =
⎡
⎣ 0 0 00 0 7
0 17 0
⎤
⎦ ;X(b) =
⎡
⎣ 0 0 20 0 0
18 0 0
⎤
⎦ ;X(c) =
⎡
⎣ 0 3 09 0 0
0 0 0
⎤
⎦
Note that each agent i is paying to any other agent j the diﬀerence between her cost
to connect directly with the source, and the cost to connect with her. Now consider
the tree m defined by:
m(a) = 0; m(b) = a; m(c) = a.
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Then, the associated cost for each agent is:
C(a;m)x = ca0 − (xba(0) + xca(0)) = 4− 9− 18 = −23
C(b;m)x = cba + xba(0) = 1 + 9 = 10
C(c;m)x = cca + xca(0) = 2 + 18 = 20.
Notice that the second term xam(a)(m2(a)) = xa0(m(0)) in C(a;m) has zero value
since a connects to 0 and m(0) = ∅. For C(b;m) and C(c;m), the third term has
zero value since for the tree m there is not k such that m(k) = b and m(k) = c.
One may think that agents b deviates from this cost distribution since she prefers
the feasible tree psuch that p(a) = 0; p(b) = 0 and p(c) = b. The new cost for each
agent is:
C(a;m)x = ca0 − (xba(0) + xca(0)) = 4
C(b;m)x = cb0 − xcb(0) = 10− 17 = −7
C(c;m)x = ccb + xcb(0) = 3 + 17 = 20.
Then, the agent b has incentive to deviate from m to another tree with total cost
17. A question arises: is it possible to guarantee the prevalence of the minimum
spanning tree for a cost structure?
2.2.1 Conditions on C(i, p)x
We now explore some conditions on the matrices X(k) and the corresponding costs
C(i; p)x.
First, the cost structure C(i; p)x must fulfil some “logical” properties with respect
to the problem and to the cost function:
• Each agent will pay, at least, his minimal link connexion:
C(i; p)x ≥ min{cik : k = 0, 1, . . . , n; k ̸= i}
• Each agent will pay, at most, their direct cost to the source:
C(i; p)x ≤ ci0
• No agent i pays other agent j for j connecting to her:
xij(i) = 0
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Note that the cost distribution provided in Example 2 does not fulfil this con-
ditions. On the other hand, we will ask the cost structure supports the minimum
cost spanning tree, as we will define later. Moreover, under these conditions, ma-
trices X(k) have null the diagonal elements; and elements in row and column k are
also null, for k ̸= 0. In the next example we show a cost structure satisfying these
conditions.
Example 3 Let us consider the following cost structure for Example 1:
X∗(0) =
⎡
⎣ 0 1 12 0 2
1 0 0
⎤
⎦ ;X∗(a) =
⎡
⎣ 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
⎤
⎦ ;X∗(b) =
⎡
⎣ 0 0 00 0 0
1 0 0
⎤
⎦ ;X∗(c) =
⎡
⎣ 0 2 02 0 0
0 0 0
⎤
⎦
Then, we have
C(a;m)x∗ = 1;C(b;m)x∗ = 3;C(c;m)x∗ = 3.
which could be a more reasonable distribution of the cost amongst the agents.
2.3 The spanning tree extensive game.
Our objective now is to define a family of sequential games parametrized by the cost
distribution problem. For a finite set {1, 2, . . . , n} consider Πn the set of permutations
over {1, 2, . . . , n}. The element π = (π(1), . . . , π(n)) ∈ Πn determines the order of
choices among players. We denote by
Γπ = (N,K, Si, Z, ui :
N∏
i=1
Ai → R)
the sequential game, where:
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players.
• K is the set of not terminal nodes, and any node k in K is an information set.
We denote by i(k) the agent playing at node k. Z is the set of terminal nodes.
• The set of actions for player i, denoted by Si, is the set of agents (included the
source) with whom player i may connect. Note that when some connections
are already done, the set of feasible players to connect in order to implement
a feasible tree that may not be the remainder of players. The set of actions at
stage t will depend on the sub-graph (a feasible tree) already implemented; in
order words, on the links already done. Namely, it depends on the permutation
π.
8
– Let’s start with the first stage with k = 1. The set of actions is
Si(1) = {0, 1, . . . , i(1)− 1, i(1) + 1, . . . , n}.
That is, player i(1) selects the player (other agent, or the source) with
whom she connects.
– For k such that i(k) ̸= π(n)
Si(k) = (N∪{0})−{i(k)}−{j ∈ N : ∃k
′ < k such that j = i(k′) and sj = i(k)}
That is, player i(k) selects, among the available agents or the source, the
one she wants to connect.
– For i(k) = π(n) we have two cases:
∗ If there is some agent j ̸= π(n) such that her action was to connect to
the source sj = 0, then
Si(k) = N∪{0}−{i(k)}−{j ∈ N : ∃k
′ < k such that j = i(k′) and sj = i(k)}
∗ In other case (no agent is already connected to the source)
Si(k) = {0}
• At the set of terminal nodes Z, payoﬀs {ui}i∈N are realized. Notice that the
cardinality of Z is the number of diﬀerent feasible trees. Then, for all z ∈ Z
there exists a unique path, hz associated to one tree denoted by pz.
• The payoﬀ function of player i, ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn) represents the amount player i
must pay for implementing the tree. We can assign to the path (s1, s2, . . . , sn)
the corresponding path hz where the payoﬀ is realized. Then,
ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = ui(hz) = ui(pz)C(i; pz)x
= cipz(i) + xipz(i)(pz(pz(i)))−
∑
{k:pz(k)=i}
xki(pz(i))
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This extensive game has n + 1 stages. At stage 0 there are n! realizations of Πn.
At first stage, the initial node of the following subgame, player i(1) has n actions
corresponding by linking with any other agent and the source. Let f1(n) = 1 the
number of initial notes. At stage 2, the action set of player i(2) depends on that
player i(1) has already chosen. The number of nodes at stage k is computed by the
following recursive1 formulae:
fk(n) = nfk−1(n)−
k∑
s=1
Ds[fk−1(n)] for 2 ≤ k ≤ n
where Ds denotes the s-derivative and n is the number of agents.
Given a permutation π a subgame of the extensive game is constructed and payoﬀ
depends on the cost structure. Next figure illustrate the extensive game Γπ(i)=i with
the cost structure in the previous example 3.
1For instance:
• f1(n) = 1
• f2(n) = n
• f3(n) = nf2(n)−D f2(n)−D2 f2(n) = n2 − 1
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Agent a Agent b
Agent b
Agent b
Agent c
Agent c
Agent c
Agent c
Agent c
Agent c
Agent c
Agent c
a→ c, b→ 0, c→ b 15 2 10 3
a→ c, b→ 0, c→ 0 32 3 10 19
a→ b, b→ 0, c→ b 14 2 9 3
a→ b, b→ 0, c→ a 13 1 9 3
a→ b, b→ 0, c→ 0 31 2 9 20
a→ 0, b→ c, c→ a 9 3 3 3
a→ 0, b→ c, c→ 0 27 4 5 18
a→ 0, b→ a, c→ b 8 2 3 3
a→ 0, b→ a, c→ a 7 1 3 3 SPE
a→ 0, b→ a, c→ 0 25 2 3 20
a→ 0, b→ 0, c→ b 17 4 10 3
a→ 0, b→ 0, c→ a 16 3 10 3
a→ 0, b→ 0, c→ 0 34 4 10 20
a→ c, b→ c, c→ 0 25 3 5 17
a→ c, b→ a, c→ 0 23 1 3 19 SPE
a→ b, b→ c, c→ 0 24 3 3 18
TREE COST SHARING
a b c
a→ b
a→ c
a→ 0
b→ c
b→ a
b→ 0
b→ c
b→ 0
b→ a
b→ c
b→ 0
c→ b
c→ 0
c→ a
c→ b
c→ 0
c→ a
c→ 0
c→ a
c→ b
c→ 0
c→ a
c→ b
c→ 0
c→ 0
c→ 0
c→ 0
EXTENSIVE GAME FOR EXAMPLE 3
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The next example illustrate the above consideration:
Example 4 Let now construct Γπ(i)=i:
• At the first stage agent a decides the agent (or the source) she wants to connect
sa.
• Now, agent b decides where to connect by taking in account sa. Suppose that
sa = b. This implies sb ̸= a.
• Finally, agent c connects to the source if no one is previously connected to it,
or she connects to some available agent otherwise.
Then, the cost structure determines the payoﬀs. For instance, if a and b select her
minimum connection, we have:
sa = b; sb = c; sc = 0
This path corresponds with the fifth terminal node. For the cost structure in Example
3, the cost of this tree p is 24 units distributed in the following way:
C(a; p)x∗ = 3;C(b; p)x∗ = 3;C(c; p)x∗ = 18.
Note that this tree does not coincide with the minimum cost spanning tree m.
Moreover, the distribution of the tree cost among agents depends on the cost structure.
This kind of sequential game is studied by Bergantin˜os and Lorenzo-Freire (2005).
They prove the existence of a permutation such that the minimum spanning tree is
assigned as a subgame perfect equilibrium. The payoﬀ profile is exactly the direct
cost for each user. In our set up, the minimum spanning tree emerges as strategic
solution independent of the permutation.
Given the sequential structure of Γπ, we want to characterize the subgame per-
fect equilibria (SPE henceforth). The equilibrium strategies should specify optimal
behavior from any information node up to the end of the game. That is, any agent’s
strategy should prescribe what is optimal from that node onwards given her oppo-
nents’ strategies. Notice that the final payoﬀs do depend on the values of x∗ and
therefore on the cost structure of the network.
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2.4 Minimum cost spanning tree cooperative game.
Following the approach in Granot and Maschler (1998), or Kar (2002), it is possible
to associate to every cost spanning tree problem a cooperative monotone game in
a natural way. We say that a coalition S ⊆ N is formed if its members agree to
connect each one of them to the source. Obviously, the members of S will choose
to connect themselves using least expensive edges. They may even choose to be
connected through players not in S. Thus, we allow free riders2, where members of
a coalition S are not allowed to use vertices occupied by members of N − S. This
is called the monotone minimum cost spanning tree cooperative game. However, we
require that the set of vertices and agents T used by a formed coalition S, S ⊆ T
should be a connected subgraph.
Following this cooperative approach, the transferable utility game is generated
by considering the minimum cost spanning tree for each coalition S ⊆ N , i.e., the
characteristic function of this cooperative game is defined as follows:
• Given a subset of agents S ⊆ N and a tree p, the cost for agents in S for this
tree is:
C(S, p) = min
S⊆T
{
∑
i∈T
cip(i)}
• Then, the characteristic function is
C(S) = min
p
{C(S, p)}
Now, by considering the usual solutions of cooperative games, a solution of the
problem of distributing the minimal cost of a spanning tree problem is obtained. For
instance, Kar (2002) provides a solution which is based in the Shapley value of this
cooperative game. Moreover he gives an axiomatic characterization of his solution.
Granot and Huberman (1984) and Granot and Mashler (1998) analyse the core and
nucleolus.
Example 5 With the cost matrix in Example 1, the characteristic function is:
v({a}) = 4; v({b}) = 5; v({c}) = 6;
v({a, b}) = 5; v({a, c}) = 6, v({b, c}) = 7;
v({a, b, c}) = 7.
2This is in contrast to other models (see, e.g., Bird (1976), Granot and Huberman (1981)).
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3 Optimal cost structure
This section is devoted to study the existence of an optimal cost structure for a given
network. What is the meaning of “optimal” cost structure? We wish that payments
xij(k) fulfil the individual incentive compatibility: no agent can found an alternative
tree p in which her cost is lower than in the minimum cost tree m:
C(i; p)x ≥ C(i;m)x ∀p, ∀i.
Next proposition provides a way to construct an optimal cost structure x. We proceed
generating the matrices X(k) for k ∈ N0 by steps. Fixing the tree m, let r be
the maximal number of links needed to connect any node to the source. At step
t ∈ {1, . . . , r}, we distinguish the set of agents connected to the source with t links,
named Nt. At step t, for any i ∈ Nt, we obtain the column i at each X(k). Namely,
the quatities xij(k) is twofold: on the one hand, they guarantee the implementation of
m, and, on the other hand, they preclude any individual deviation of implementing
another feasible tree than m. So payments from Nt to Nt′ for t′ ∈ {t + 1, . . . , r},
is merely an incentive to deter the deviation from the social goal, although these
payments are be not eﬀective in m.
Proposition 1 There exist a cost structure x such that C(i; p)x ≥ C(i;m)x ∀p and
for all player i.
Proof.
In order to prove this existence of a cost structure satisfying C(i; p)x ≥ C(i;m)x,
we are going to define, given a social network (N0,C), a cost structure x of (possible)
payments satisfying our requirements. We proceed by steps from 1 to r:
step 1
Consider the set of agents N1 = {α ∈ N : m(α) = 0} ; that is, those agents that in
the minimum cost tree connect directly to the source. Now we have two possibilities:
all agents go directly to the source, or there is some agent that connects indirectly to
the source.
case 1 N1 = N
In this case, m(α) = 0, ∀α ∈ N . So, no agent connects to any other agent and
payments will be not eﬀective Then, we define
xij(k) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ N, k ∈ N ∪ {0}
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Let us suppose that there is some agent i and some tree p such that
C(i; p)x = cip(i) < C(i;m)x = cim(i)
Consider the tree q defined by:
q(j) =
{
m(j) = 0 j ̸= i
p(i)
Then, we obtain
Cq = Cm +
(
cip(i) − cim(i)
)
< Cm
contradicting that m is the minimum cost tree. The proof concludes.
case 2 N1 ̸= N
Let β an agent that does not connect directly to the source in the minimal cost
tree m, β ∈ N −N1; then we define
xαβ(k) = max {cα0 − cαβ, 0} , ∀α ∈ N1
What are we doing? By defining these payments, agents that connect to the source
within m will prefer (or will be indiﬀerent) this connection to any other provided by
an alternative tree. That is, we are given incentives to the agents to chose the socially
eﬃcient tree m. Eﬀectively, for any α ∈ N1
C(α; p)x = cαp(α) + xαp(α)
(
p2(α)
)
−
∑
i:p(i)=α
xiα(p(α))
(note that the third term is equal to zero, since no agent pays anything to the
ones that connect directly to the source)
= cαp(α) + xαp(α)
(
p2(α))
)
=
{
cαp(α) if cαp(α) ≥ cα0
cαp(α) + (cα0 − cαβ) = cα0 otherwise
and
C(α;m)x = cα0 + xα0
(
m2(α)
)
−
∑
i:m(i)=α
xiα(0) = cα0
so,
C(α;m)x ≤ C(α; p)x ∀α ∈ N1
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At this point we have proved that agents in N1, which are the only ones that have
non-zero payments, attach their optimal choice in the minimum cost tree m. In the
next steps we follow a similar argument in order to define the cost structure for the
remaining agents so they also attach their optimal choice at m.
step 2
Now, the costs of the links involving elements outside N1 have been modified,
since these agents can receive some quantities from the agents in N1. Let us name
c2ij = cij −
n∑
r=1
xri(j)
This is the amount she pays for connecting agent j, once we have discounted the
amount she receives from the agents in N1 for join j. Consider now the set of agents
N2 = {α ∈ N − N1 : m2(α) = 0} (the agents that arrive to the source with exactly
two links). If any remaining agent is in this set, N = N1 ∪ N2 and we only need to
define the payments between these agents. In other case, we will need to continue
with the other agents.
case 1 N2 = N −N1
In this case, m2(α) = 0, ∀α ∈ N . Then, we modify our vector x of payments in
the following way:
xij(0) = max{cim(i) − c
2
ij , 0} ∀i, j ∈ N1, i ̸= j
Note that these changes do not aﬀect to the payments from agents in N1, so only
null coeﬃcients are changed. Moreover, only payments are made from i to j for j
joining the source, in such a way that the agents do not wish to deviate from tree
m due the amounts they are now receiving. We continue naming x to the new cost
structure. Observe that the cost function remains invariant for all agents in N1 and
then these agents still are in an optimal situation at tree m, that is
C(α;m)x ≤ C(α; p)x ∀α ∈ N1
In order to compute the new cost of a tree p, for agents outside N1, we need to
distinguish if through p they arrive to the source in one or two steps (like in m) or if
they need more links.
sub-case a p2(α) = 0
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Then,3
C(α; p)x = cαp(α) + xαp(α)
(
p2(α)
)
−
∑
i:p(i)=α
xiα(p(α)) =
= cαp(α) + xαp(α) (0)−
∑
i:p(i)=α
xiα(p(α)) ≥
≥ cαp(α) + xαp(α) (0)−
n∑
i=1
xiα(p(α)) = c
2
αp(α) + xαp(α) (0) ≥
≥ cαm(α) = C(α;m)x
sub-case b p2(α) ̸= 0
Let us suppose that there is some agent i and some tree p such that
C(i; p)x < C(i;m)x, p
2(i) ̸= 0.
Consider the tree q defined by:
q(j) =
{
m(j) = 0 j ̸= i
p(i)
Then, it is easy to check that for all j ̸= i we have
C(j; q)x = C(j;m)x; and
C(i; q)x = C(i; p)x
So,
Cq =
n∑
i=1
C(i; q)x <
n∑
i=1
C(i;m)x = Cm
contradicting that m is the minimum cost tree. The proof concludes.
case 2 N2 ̸= N −N1
Let β an agent that does not connect via m to the source in one or two links,
β ∈ N − (N1 ∪N2); then if we modify the payments by considering
3The argument for the last inequality is analogous to the one used in step 1, case 2.
17
xαβ(k) = max{cαm(α) − c
2
αβ , 0} ∀α ∈ N2, k ∈ (N − (N1 ∪N2)) ∪ {0}, k ̸= α, β
we obtain
C(α; p)x = cαp(α) + xαp(α)
(
p2(α)
)
−
∑
i:p(i)=α
xiα(p(α)) =
= cαp(α) + xαp(α)
(
p2(α)
)
−
∑
i:p(i)=α
xiα(p(α)) ≥
≥ cαp(α) + xαp(α)
(
p2(α)
)
−
n∑
i=1
xiα(p(α)) =
= c2αp(α) + xαp(α)
(
p2(α)
)
≥ cαm(α) = C(α;m)x
so,
C(α;m)x ≤ C(α; p)x ∀α ∈ N2
Therefore we have that the agents in N1 ∪ N2 attach her optimal tree at the
minimum cost tree m. By repeating an analogous argument as in [step 2] we conclude
the proof.
3.1 Optimal cost structure is not unique
We can observe that the cost structure in Example 3 is optimal. In the next example
we define an alternative cost structure which is also optimal.
Example 6 Consider the cost structure defined by:
Xˆ(0) =
⎡
⎣ 0 5 30 0 1
0 1 0
⎤
⎦ ; Xˆ(a) =
⎡
⎣ 0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
⎤
⎦ ; Xˆ(b) =
⎡
⎣ 0 0 20 0 0
2 0 0
⎤
⎦ ; Xˆ(c) =
⎡
⎣ 0 3 00 0 0
0 0 0
⎤
⎦
Then, we have
C(a;m)xˆ = 4;C(b;m)xˆ = 1;C(c;m)xˆ = 2.
The main problem is not about the existence of several optimal cost structures,
but they propose diﬀerent distributions of the cost among the agents. An interesting
property of optimal cost structures is that of convexity.
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Proposition 2 The set of optimal cost structures for a problem (N0,C) is a convex
set.
Proof. Let us consider two optimal cost structures x1, x2 and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Consider
the cost structure x = λx1+ (1− λ)x2. It is immediate to observe that x satisfies the
required conditions and that
C(i;m)x = λC(i;m)x1 + (1− λ)C(i;m)x2
so x is also an optimal cost structure.
Moreover, it is immediate to see that this set is also closed and bounded. More
precisely, it is a convex polyhedron.
4 Strategic and cooperative properties
Now, we are going to analyse the behavior of the optimal cost structure from strategic
and cooperative points of view.
4.1 Strategic game: implementing a SPE
Proposition 3 Given an optimal cost structure x for a problem (N0,C), the minimal
cost tree m is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the strategic game Γπ.
Proof. Let X be an optimal cost structure. Let Γ be the extensive game associ-
ated to x and π ∈ Π any order permutation over the set of player {1, . . . , n} which
generates the branches at stage 0. Notice that Γ is a finite extensive game with perfect
information. Therefore, there exist pure subgame perfect equilibrium probably not
unique. To obtain the proposition is enough to prove that the path in the extensive
game associated to the minimal cost tree m is the best response at any node for the
associated subgame where each player implement the minimal spanning tree. At any
node of the path related to the minimal spanning tree, denoted by hm, every agent
plays the best action given the best strategy of the players onward. By definition of
m and x, we know that C(i;m)x ≤ C(i; p)x for all p ̸= m. In particular for any tree p
that is not m in the subgame where m is involved. Therefore, m is the best response
for all player at any node of hm and the result holds.
The strategic game Γπ may have several SPE diﬀerent from the one given by the
mcst m, as we show in the following example. But, if we consider that agents may
appear in any possible order π, then m is the only SPE that remains.
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Example 7 Given the cost structure in Example 3, we know that m is a SPE that
provides the following cost distribution
(SPE 1): [1, 3, 3]
But, by considering the permutation π(i) = i, there is another SPE provided by tree
p, defined by:
p(a) = c; p(b) = a; p(c) = 0
The cost of this tree is 23 units which are distributed in the following way
(SPE 2): [1, 3, 19]
This equilibrium cannot be regarded as a good solution under the social point of
view. Nevertheless, it emerges as a subgame perfect equilibrium. This is so, since the
player 3 only has the choice to connect to the source. This mandatory action jointly
to the circunstance that the rest of the players in the corresponding subgame have as
best response the above tree, entail the prevalence of this unsatisfactory equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Given an optimal cost structure x for a problem (N0,C), the minimal
cost tree m is the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the strategic game Γπ, for all
permutation π.
Proof. Let us suppose that the agents chose their strategies in the order {1, 2, . . . , n}
(that is, we consider the permutation π(i) = i). It has been already shown that m is
a SPE. If there is another tree p that also corresponds to a SPE, then since p does
not minimize there is an agent (say agent 2) such that:
C(2;m)x < C(2; p)x
If we now consider a permutation such that π(1) = 2 (the first agent who decides is
agent 2), then clearly tree p will not be chosen by this agent, so p is not a SPE.
4.2 Cooperative game: included in the core
Proposition 5 Given an optimal cost structure x for a problem (N0,C), the cost
distribution {C(i;m)x} for i ∈ N is in the core of the cooperative game (N, v).
Proof. The Core of the cooperative games is
Co(v) =
{
z ∈ Rn+ :
∑
k∈S
zk ! v(S)
∑
k∈N
zk = v(N)
}
To prove that the distributions of the minimum cost among the agents provided
by the optimal cost structure x belongs to the core let us suppose that there is a
subset S ⊆ N such that
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v(S) <
∑
i∈S
C(i;m)x
We consider two cases:
case 1
The minimum cost tree connecting each agents in S to the source only involves agents
in S. We denote by pS the network providing v(S). Then,
v(S) =
∑
i,j∈S:ps(i)=j
cij
Consider a network pQ, Q = N −S that connects the elements outside S with the
source not involving elements in Q . Then,
p = ps ∪ pQ
is a network connecting each agent to the source. Note that in this network the
agents in S and outside S are no connected, so the cost function only depends on the
elements in each subset. So
v(S) =
∑
i,j∈S:ps(i)=j
cij =
∑
i∈S
C(i; p)x <
∑
i∈S
C(i;m)x
and then there is some agent k ∈ S such that C(k; p)x < C(k;m)x, which contradicts
that X fulfils conditions (number lo que sea).
case 2
If the minimum tree for agents in S involves agents outside this set, then v(S) = v(T )
S ⊂ T . Since coalition T contains more agents than S, we have
v(T ) = v(S) <
∑
i∈S
C(i; p)x <
∑
i∈T
C(i;m)x
and we can apply case 1 to the set T to find a contradiction.
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